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Abstract	
  
There is a new perspective developing within the international community on
Diasporas and their potential to assist in the development process of their country of
origin. The discussion began from the realization that transnational flows of remittances
from sending countries (core) to receiving countries (periphery) increasingly surpass
donor contributions to developing countries. The argument further discusses different
socio-economic strategies to use when diasporic communities residing in developed
countries (core) are assisting their homeland (periphery).
This paper will look at the Haitian Diaspora in the United States and its active
transnational link to Haiti. Since the days of post-Duvalierism, the Haitian Diaspora has
actively participated in the developmental process of the country. Remittances are no
longer the only way in which the Haitian diaspora assists. Seemingly there has been an
increase in transnational activity via political and socio-economic organizations and
associations.
However, the addition of the Haitian Diaspora as a major force in Haiti’s
development process (as seen in the last 10 years) is uncertain. It is doubtful because the
divided social structure of Haitian history, has transplanted into Haitian diasporic
communities. The social construct of Haitian émigrés in the United States and their
active role in politics and social-development affects the Haitian democratic and
developmental process.

4

Looking at how the Haitian Diaspora political and non-political organizations and
associations operate, it becomes apparent that the fractured social class structure within
the diaspora is divided by socio-economic status. Although a unified Haitian Diaspora
has proven to be a strong lobby (i.e., swaying American policy and collective remittance
contributions) the factions that exist beyond that have implications on sustaining the
efforts taken on by the diaspora.

5

Chapter	
  1:	
  Introduction	
  

Topic	
  
In 1990, President Jean-Bertrand Aristide called upon the “tenth department” to
help rehabilitate Haitian development beyond remittances. Since then, what has the
impact of the Haitian Diaspora on Haiti’s development been like? Has that impact fared
positively or negatively in Haitian development? Although the Haitian Diaspora heeded
Aristide’s request in the early 1990’s to assist in Haiti’s development beyond remittances,
its participation and contributions have impacted Haitian development negatively. This
negative impact is evident in two ways: 1) The fragmentation in class structure that
existed and exists in Haiti today has been transplanted into the Haitian Diaspora society
within the United States, and 2) This fragmentation can be seen in the way in which
organizations and associations of the Haitian Diaspora are created and interact.
An explanatory analysis of the social construct of Haitian émigrés in the United
States will clarify why this group has negatively affected Haitian development. This
analysis will concentrate on the Haitian contemporary diaspora (foreign-born) - those
who began migrating to the United States in the early days of the Duvalier regime. The
first part of this paper, will give a brief historical examination of the colonial society in
Saint-Domingue, the Haitian revolution, and the period that followed until Francois
Duvalier came to power to illustrate the deep-rooted class fragmentation in Haiti.

The

migration of Haitians will begin to explain how the social/class divisions that exist in
Haiti were recreated in the United States. The second part of this paper will concentrate
6

on the Haitian Diaspora in the United States. Leaning on ethnography1 approaches of
immigration as a transnational process2, the study will explain the way in which each
wave of the Haitian Diaspora settled in the United States and retained social and class
fragmentation.

The third part of this paper will specifically take a look at how the

Haitian Diaspora has maintained social and class divisions through group associations
within the United States.

In conclusion, this explanatory thesis will show that the

fragmented social structure of the Haitian Diaspora existing in the United States affects
the way in which diaspora associations function thereby affecting Haitian development
negatively.

Justification/Rationale	
  
The research question I expect to answer is placed within the broader context of
international relations, development, and transnational migration. In 1949, Haiti, an
under-developed country (a third-world country) was amongst the countries to open its
doors to the development community (the United Nations) allowing development
advising through economic strategies. However, a 1950 coup in the politically unstable
country ended this venture, and all development aid was abruptly withdrawn from Haiti.

1

Ethnography is defined as the scientific description of the customs of individual peoples
and cultures. (Oxford American Dictionaries).
2
Laguerre, Michel S, Diasporic Citizenship: Haitian Americans in Transnational
America (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), p. 6
7

Development in Haiti has continually been impeded through the decades, making
“Haiti one of the most dependent countries in the world.”3 Haiti has repeatedly ranked
amongst the least developed countries within the global community. Unable to meet the
basic standards of development, scholarly discourse prompted the international
development community to shift from finding new theories of development to finding out
why models of development are not effective.
As early as 1955, scholars such as John R.P. Friedmann viewed economic
development theories as having “certain general problems of planning” that would
require that these theories be “explored sufficiently.”4 Friedmann thought it important to
focus largely on analyzing the underlying social structures of a state system.

In

Development Planning in Haiti: A Critique of the U.N. Report (1955), Friedmann
conveys that the development strategies of the UN Report failed to acknowledge the
“social order of Haitian life.”5 He outlined four issues that he felt need to be addressed to
begin assessing developmental strategies: 1) Whose interests are relevant in leading to
economic development? 2) Are proposed measures estimated for future needs of the
country? 3) To what extent is development induced by popular participation? And 4) Is
there an objective structure?
Elaborating further, Friedman begins with the contrasting class system that arose
in Haiti. This, he argues, was not considered when “a mission had been invited to Haiti
to draw up…a comprehensive framework… for the policy it advises the government to
3

Gros, Jean-Germain, “Haiti: The Political Economy and Sociology of Decay and
Renewal,” Latin American Research Review, Vol. 35, No. 3. 2000, p. 224.
4
Friedmann. John R.P. “Developmental Planning in Haiti: A Critique of the U.N.
Report,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol.4, No.1, Part 1. Oct., 1955, p.
39.
5
Ibid, pp.39
8

apply in endeavoring to promote the economic development of the country.”6 Friedman
emphasized that in order to engage developing countries with development strategies
there is a need to look at the socio-historical aspect of the state. In Haiti’s case, “a
successful

program

of

economic

development

should

ideally

achieve

some

accommodation of the interests of both the elite and peasantry.” Friedmann argues that
by not understanding the social implications of the development program for Haiti, any
development-planning strategy would “greatly weaken the effectiveness” of economic
development. Friedmann also emphasized local participation stating, “local participation
can

be

a

powerful

instrument

for

affecting

social

and

economic

change

democratically…creating a built-in permanence.”
With Friedmann’s claims my argument begins to take form.

Friedmann’s

emphasis on class structure is vital, as it highlights the need to account for a country’s
social structure when formulating development strategies. In Haiti’s case, the economic
development strategies that were implemented did not benefit the whole, but only a
certain few. Advisers did not understand or care to understand the country’s complicated
social order. Soon after the implementation of these strategies a coup occurred, which
could very well indicate that there was a class or social struggle. This also suggests there
may have been a weak government in Haiti, susceptible to infighting within its own
ranks, and incapable of quelling social unrest.
Continued instability in Haitian governance during and after the Duvalier regime
once again shifted discourse in the 1980s and early ‘90s. Topics on Haiti changed from

6

Friedmann. John R.P. “Developmental Planning in Haiti: A Critique of the U.N.
Report,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol.4, No.1, Part 1. Oct., 1955,
pp. 39.
9

why development aide is not assisting Haitian development to a more historical analysis
of why problems in Haiti persist.

These discussions did not offer solutions or

recommendations to Haiti’s problematique, but gave origin to two perspectives on the
Haitian dilemma: 1) Haiti’s history, politics and social culture and social structure, and 2)
external factors; Haiti and France in the early nineteenth century and relations between
Haiti and the United States in the twentieth.7
The prolific discussion around both of these perspectives could be seen as an
indication that Haiti’s problems are complex in nature.

Disagreements on these

perspectives between Haiti-born scholars and non-Haitian scholars and between neoliberals and populists continue over the root causes of Haiti’s problem and possible
solutions.8
In recent research on development and migration, scholars have started to shape
discussion about Haiti within the context of its diaspora. With over 535,0009 foreignborn Haitians in the United States alone, the force of the constant transnational movement
is impressive. Although much of the early scholarship around Haitian Diasporas has
been looked at through an anthropological lens (ethnography), the post-Duvalier era and
a more open socio-political environment have changed that. A large and ever-growing
population within the U.S., the Haitian Diaspora has proven to have significant impact in

7

Gros, Jean-Germain, “Haiti: The Political Economy and Sociology of Decay and
Renewal,” Latin American Research Review, Vol. 35, No. 3. (2000), p 211
8
Ibid, p 212.
9
Terrazas, Aaron. “Haitian Immigrants in the United States.” Migrant Policy Institute.
January 2010. March 2011
<http://www.migrationinformation.org/USfocus/display.cfm?id=770#1>
10

Haiti. So much so that social scientists from international relations and development
have begun to take notice.

	
  
Thesis	
  
The transnational activity that the Haitian Diaspora partakes in today has created
an array of discussion around their assistance in the development of Haiti. This thesis will
argue that Haitian Diaspora participation and contributions to Haiti’s development have
impacted Haitian development negatively. Negative meaning the added presence of the
Haitian Diaspora in Haitian affairs has impeded (1) government cohesion to secure its
post-Duvalier democratic transition, and (2) impedes the government’s ability to become
a more responsive system of governance.

Theoretical	
  Framework	
  /	
  Literature	
  Review	
  
A dependency analysis will be employed to explain diasporic relations to Haitian
development. The focus on Haitian development and Diasporas is supported in both the
development literature within the dependency theory and general literature on Haiti.

“The dependency theory is rooted in long intellectual traditions reflecting upon
the dependence of Latin American countries on foreign political and economic powers.”10
Although it is recognized as essentially developing from two different frameworks,
10

Sachsenmaier, Dominic. World History as Ecumenical History? Journal of World
History, Vol. 18, No. 4 (2007), pp 475
11

Marxist and structuralist, the former is recognized as the tradition from which
dependency arose.11 It is also acknowledged that Andre Gunder Frank provided the most
influential dependency analysis with his work on “dependence” and “development of the
underdeveloped.”12
In, The Origins of Dependency Analysis, Joseph L. Love recounts the progression
of the dependency framework. Love acknowledges Andre Gunder Frank’s contribution
to dependency analysis with his seminal work on “dependence” and “development of the
underdeveloped,” however; he provides a thorough explanation on Furtado, Sunkel, and
Cadoso’s early structural contributions to the dependency framework.
Love begins with Raul Prebisch, a structuralist economist, who first introduced
the Centre and Periphery concept in 1949, which stated that between these two elements
a process of unequal exchange occurs.13 This process of unequal exchange revealed
negative features intrinsic in the Periphery’s economy, thereby impeding development in
the periphery.

In the 1950s, the UN Economic Commission of Latin America (ECLA)

took the concept of “periphery and core” and implemented economic development
policies in Latin American countries to assist in development.

Import-substitution

industrialization (ISI), as these policies were collectively called, became the topic of
debate amongst scholars when countries that had implemented these policies were not
developing. The failing trajectory of these policies broadened the focus from purely
economic analysis in development to include social issues or structure of imbalance
11

Love, Joseph L, “The Origins of Dependency Analysis” Journal of Latin American
Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1. February 1990, pp.143.
12
Andre Gunder Frank Official website. March 2011
<http://www.rrojasdatabank.info/agfrank/research.html#DEVELOPMENT%20AND%20
UNDERDEVELOPMENT>
13
Ibid, pp145
12

created at the periphery.

Celsio Furtado ‘historicized’ the analysis, by looking at the

fundamental differences (features) between Core and Periphery, thus departing from
formal economic analysis.14

With the inclusion of the historical process, core and

periphery analysis began to take into account ‘social and political viability as an essential
criterion when attempting to set and meet realistic development targets (Love, 1990). On
the side of social viability, ‘income inequality among social classes became a practical
indicator.

Moreover, Osvaldo Sunkel’s criticism on ‘agricultural performance’

uncovered more problems in ISI policies that inhibited the development of periphery
countries. More specifically, these problems were the persistent rather than diminishing
dependency on the foreign trade sector, unemployment or underemployment in both
urban and rural sectors, and the apparent concentration of income in the upper income
brackets.15
On the viability of political criterion, an analysis of the agrarian reform program
of the Eduardo Frei government of Chile resulted in a tendency toward political
polarization in the countryside and beyond.16 In this case, it showed that implementing
ISI policies in the periphery would eventually yield political difficulties.
To further formulate the dependency framework, Furtado elaborated on an earlier
contention that development and underdevelopment were linked.17 These two processes,
Furtado claimed, were historically associated and therefore, underdevelopment could not

14

Love, Joseph L. The Origins of Dependency Analysis. Journal of Latin American
Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1(Feb., 1990), pp. 152
15
Ibid, pp. 154
16
Ibid, pp. 156
17
Ibid, pp. 158
13

be a phase in the passage to development.18 Moreover, Furtado introduced the element of
social class. He argued that class struggle had historically been the engine of economic
growth in the West, and therefore, since labor is unorganized in the Periphery, above all
in the rural sector, the process fails to work there.19
Love credits Fernando Henrique Cardoso as playing a major role in moving the
dependency perspective towards an analysis of social relations.20 Furtado’s collaborative
work with Enzo Faletto also contributed an important element in the ‘mutual interests
among social classes across the Centre-Periphery system.

More specifically, the

interests of the bourgeoisie in the Centre (and by implication, those of its proletariat)
overlapped those of the bourgeoisie of the Periphery.21 The historical and the social
elements introduced by Furtado and Sunkel further developed the basic tenets of the
development theory formulated.
Culminating with Frank’s dependency analysis, the fundamental premise of the
dependency theory includes four basic elements to initiate an explanatory breakdown of
the world system: 1) characterization of modern capitalism as a Centre-Periphery relation
between the developed, industrial West and the underdeveloped, agricultural Third world,
2) Adoption of the system-wide historical approach and therefore rejection of the
modernization theory, 3) hypothesis of unequal exchange as well as asymmetrical power

18

Love, Joseph L. The Origins of Dependency Analysis. Journal of Latin American
Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1(Feb., 1990), pp. 157
19
Ibid, pp. 157
20
Ibid, pp. 159
21
Ibid, pp. 159
14

relation between center and periphery, and 4) Non-viability of a capitalist path to
development based on leadership of national bourgeoisies.22
To further illustrate that the unequal trajectory of the periphery and core affected
society, politics, and the state at the periphery, Andre Gunder Frank’s work in 1969
emphasized a historical look at the periphery and center together.

He examined

economic dependency as a consequence of emerging relationships among political–
economic formations, which were brought into being as capitalism expanded.23 Frank
posited that the most important fact about any nation has been its relations with other
nations; therefore any observations of contemporary society must be explained in terms
of their historical relations to other societies.24
Borrowing the concept of ‘internal colonialism’ from Mexican political scientist,
Pablo Gonzalez Casanova, Frank hypothesizes that there is a link between ‘internal
colonialism’ and that of ‘metropolis-satellite’ relations.25 Internal colonialism as defined
by Casanova occurs whereby industrial and political Centers within the satellite exploit
their dependent regions through fiscal and exchange policies, and by draining off capital
and talent.26
The significant trajectory of the dependency framework can be closely related to
the way in which Haiti, as a satellite, has fared in the world system in terms of
‘underdevelopment.’ Haiti’s well-documented history as a colony (Saint Domingue)
22

Love, Joseph L. “The Origins of Dependency Analysis,” Journal of Latin American
Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1(Feb., 1990), pp. 157
23
Friedmann, Harriet; Wayne, Jack, “Dependency Theory: A Critique,” Canadian
Journal of Sociology. Vol. 2, No. 4 (Autum, 1977), pp. 399
24
Ibid, pp. 401
25
Love, Joseph L, “The Origins of Dependency Analysis,” Journal of Latin American
Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1(Feb., 1990), pp. 164
26
Ibid, pp. 157
15

offers the initial dependency notion of centre-periphery relations. Internal colonialism is
seen in post-revolution until modern-day Haiti.
Haiti experienced evolutions that twice have left it in the periphery: first, the
centre-periphery relationship with France, and then, the centre-periphery relations of
Haiti (post-revolution) with the United States. Moving forward a century after Haitian
independence, in 1915 the core-periphery relationship was fortified with the occupation
of Haiti by the United States. This link cultivated not only the centre-periphery
relationship, United States and Haiti, respectively but also a metropolis-satellite
relationship. As dependency theorists suggest, political inequality manifested in nondemocratic governments in the peripheral is maintained with the economic, political, and
sometime military support of the elites in the centre countries.27 Furthermore, Frank’s
metropolis-satellite proposal is the modern-day relationship that exists between the
United States and Haiti.

The notion of metropolis-satellite can also be seen in the

migration of Haitians to the United States (core).

Diaspora transnational activity

(between the US and Haiti and vice versa) takes place on a constant basis, which in turn
further expands and perpetuates the metropolis-satellite relationship.
As

an

innovative

interpretation

of

the

world

of

development

and

underdevelopment, the dependency theory did attract criticism. Sociologists Friedmann
and Wayne assessed Frank’s interpretation of the model and found that a more Marxist
approach to dependency would suffice to clarify several “problems” that they found were
consistent in Frank’s argument. This difficulty they found was apparent once one moves
beyond those historically observable consequences of the dependency relation within
27

Bollen, Kenneth, “World System Position, Dependency, and Democracy: The CrossNational Evidence,” American Sociological Review, Vol. 48, No. 4 (Aug., 1983), pp. 468
16

individual satellites or dependencies (Friedmann 1977:402). This problem was more
pronounced when it came to 1) bilateral relations, 2) a hierarchically ordered set of roles,
and 3) the product of relationships (Friedmann 1977:402).
Friedmann and Wayne consider the dependency theory to lack analysis on how
shifts of bilateral relations occur. However, in the case of Haiti this change can be
justified in Haiti’s change from being a periphery of France to that of the United States.28
Their second argument on a hierarchically ordered set of roles is to ‘abandon
relationships as the unit of analysis and to focus on the nation.’ However, this argument
would negate the modern and intricate new units of analysis linking core-periphery states
and which are becoming more important in the world capitalist system. For instance,
migration as a new concept in development but not so new in practice, accounts for the
way the core-periphery relationships are maintained. Furthermore, it helps to explain the
extension of metropolis-satellite connection that exists by newly formed levels of
analysis.
Concurrence with Friedmann and Wayne’s third argument on the product of
relationships comes with the understanding that class relations are created first and then
spatial relationships take place.
The dependence framework helps to explain class relations through historical
analysis within dependent states as they are incorporated into a changing world capitalist
system (Franck, 1972:30).29 In conjunction with the dependency school of thought this

28

Since Haitian independence, its attempts to enter into the world capitalist system were
abetted by European powers. Although ostracized by the international community the
United States –who did not recognize Haiti until 1862-started traded relations with Haiti.
29
Friedmann, Harriet; Wayane, Jack, “Dependency Theory: A Critique,” Canadian
Journal of Sociology. Vol. 2, No. 4 (Autum, 1977), pp. 402
17

topic will look at the migration factor. Generally, migration of a labor force from
periphery to centre becomes an important issue that affects the economic development,
labor, and distribution of income, known as the international wage-labor migration.30
Others would call it brain-drain. It follows that for the poor, international migration may
be more certain and secure pathway to economic and social mobility than local
opportunities.

31

And although this paper will not concentrate on this issue, it is

important to mention as it is one of the many reasons why Diasporas first decide to
migrate and ultimately decide on if and how Diasporas will partake in transnational
activities.
Randolph Bourne’s notion of transnationality however is more closely linked to
the way in which Haitian Diaspora in the United States relate to Haiti (their country of
origin). Transnationality, as it pertains to the Haitian Diaspora is: 1) The country itself
where people of diverse cultural traditions meet is transnational (tradition/culture in both
countries is a weaving of back and forth, 2) Impact on the relations between the United
States and other countries is constant (in this case, the US is able to influence other
countries due to the relationships maintained by foreign-born residents with their
homelands.), 3) Transnational relationships turn the US into a center from which radiate
linkages with satellite countries, and 4) The state is no longer the only or exclusive arena
for the practice of citizenship.
Michel S. Laguerre takes Bourne’s concept one-step further by focusing on
transnational activities partaken by Diasporas. He formulates his argument based on

30

Jones, Richard C, “Remittances and Inequality: A Question of Migration State and
Geographic Scale,” Economic Geography, Vol. 74, No. 1 (Jan., 1998), p. 8
31
Ibid, pp. 9
18

active Diasporas. This, Laguerre defines, is a diaspora that maintains its relationships
with the homeland in real and not simply in symbolic terms.32 In this case the Haitian
Diaspora fits this criterion and more specifically for its efforts in Haitian development.
How then does the Haitian Diaspora impede Haitian development? Migration has
historically been considered a consequence of underdevelopment (class struggle). The
historical class struggle in Haiti and the reasons and way in which migration of the
Haitian Diaspora took place will begin to formulate the answer to this question.
Eventually the way that the Haitian Diaspora settled in the United States and the way the
diaspora functions will begin to highlight how the diaspora is impeding development in
Haiti.

Discussions on Haiti come from two strains of thought 1) Haiti’s deeply rooted
history of slavery, conflicting class structure, and military intervention in government are
the causes for its cyclical condition of radical changes and fickle successes in
development; and 2) A history of western intervention (French, Spanish, and US) are the
cause for much of the lack of development, democracy, and Haiti’s place as UNDP’s
human development index lowest ranking in the western hemisphere. Neither argument
is more correct than the other. In fact, both arguments would be relevant within the
debate of Third world development and conditions of the state to develop with the
eventual push to the process of democratization.
The thesis will lend on the first argument. Literature based on looking at the
historical conditions that Haiti came from has been plenty. Books, such as Haiti: Family
32

Laguerre, Michel S, Diasporic Citizenship: Haitian Americans in Transnational
America (New York: St. Martin’s Press,1998), p. 8
19

Business (1985) written by Rod Prince, recount Haiti’s history to argue that reoccurring
themes in Haitian history should be looked to as indicators of current despair of the
Haitian population and potential future occurrences in the country. Furthermore, these
themes or indicators serve to explain that although there is a strong US presence
“influencing the course of events in Haiti, the US does not control Haiti.” Therefore, due
to its deeply historical habits, certain events will occur because these themes are already
shaping the future of events to come.
These re-occurring themes, he insists, came about not only since Haiti’s
independence in 1804, but were created and existed vibrantly during its colonial times
under French rule. Such themes like, “the tradition of armed intervention in government,
the absence of any developed political system, and the long standing practice of
presidents regarding state finance as their personal property” still permeate heavily in
Haiti today. Consequently, from the forces within, the country will once again fall victim
to a toppled government once the Duvalier regime “prove(s) inadequate.”
Prince’s approach to Haiti’s ‘born into ruin’ account is a good indication that
history is critical to understanding current events. Although he succinctly explains the
colonial take-over of the western one-third of the Island of Hispaniola, he subsequently
delves into the description of “lucrative colony” that Saint-Domingue came to be.

It is

at this juncture that Prince takes the time to examine the class structure of the colony and
deep sentiments of each class that “contained the seeds of multiple conflicts,” and which
were and still are today the harrowing prescription of Haitian instability.
Prince chronicles the usual suspects of the Haitian class structure: the grand
blancs, the petits blans, the mulattoes or gens de coluleur and the slaves, who trumped

20

the other classes in numbers. One critical observation, which Prince uses to support his
argument of Haiti’s ‘militarized and authoritarian’ inclination, is the inclusion of the
Navy Ministry in the Saint-Domingue society. He mentions that, ‘the military officers in
charge of towns and districts were the undisputed rulers of the areas of town and
districts.’ These “colonial administrator(s) eagerly took advantage of the opportunity to
turn their power to profit…many were recruited from among disgraced officer, bankrupt
nobles or merchants, dispatched to Saint-Domingue…to regain their wealth and return to
France.”33 In the end, “authoritarian military power and extensive corruption became so
deeply entrenched in the colony that they survived throughout the following 200 years as
permanent and essential features of Haitian life.”34
Prince’s look into the past is important to understanding modern-day Haiti and its
struggles. Furthermore, the power politics among the different classes is relevant to the
way in which specific class faction within Haitian society is still prominent in modernday Haiti and in the way it functions. However, the way in which his emphasis on power
politics within the slave society comes across is that Haitian culture has an inherent
nature of corruption. Less blame is placed on the foreign powers of the present day,
which is essentially saying that Haitians will do this no matter how good or bad
intentioned the influence of the foreign powers is. It begs the question: Would the
powerful elites, at any given time, acted differently if those outside influences would not
have been there?
Since independence, outside colonial powers hovered over Haiti as it attempted to
regain a semblance of order within its borders and its fragmented class structure.
33
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“European nations contributed to the plundering by regularly demanding compensation
for allegedly maltreated subjects.”35 A more distant approach but equally as damaging,
western power took years before recognizing Haiti and deeming trade with them illegal.
In addition to and beyond the US occupation (1915 – 1934), the US left a permanent
reminder that foreign intervention will always be a factor in Haitian politics, when it “rewrote the Haitian Constitution to permit foreign ownership of property.”36 Furthermore,
years of US financial backing through ‘development aid’ has proven to be a detriment to
responsible governance and political cohesion amongst the class structures.
Haitian Diaspora Association and Their Investments in Basic Social Services in
Haiti is a report commissioned by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and led
by Patricia Wiess Fagen. This report sets out to attain information on ‘how Haitian
migrants and those still in the country are contributing to development processes’ in
Haiti. Looking at ‘migrant diaspora and their remittance practices’ the study focuses on
host country organization initiatives in Health and Education by Haitian Diaspora in the
United States and in Canada.
The research was gathered through “survey questionnaires, open-ended interviews
with key individuals and assembled books, articles and relevant documents that provided
analysis and a broader context to the interviews.’ It critically conducted a two part
approach: 1) Focusing on how diaspora groups seek to impact their home communities
and 2) Focusing on whether there is an impact and how community members
participated-or did not participate-in programmed activities.
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The findings of this report fall along the lines of developmental studies. In the
case of Haiti, this report shows that international organizations have taken an interest in
finding evidence not only on the significance of a diaspora group but also its functionality
in development. The report introduces “collective remittances” not only as an individual
migrant support mechanism for country of origin, but also as “diaspora associations
dedicated to addressing unmet needs” in their country of origin. In the case of Haiti,
Fagen et al., identifies three types of groups that fall under the umbrella of associations:
1) home town associations (HTAs), 2) faith-based association, and 3) professional
associations.
The study analyzes all three groups in the context of how these associations group
themselves and decide on developmental projects in Haiti. It focuses less on the impact of
these associations in Haiti. Mostly this is due to the lack of most of these associations not
having obtained a 501c3 non-profit status (therefore, not having to report, in which case
not having information readily available), “reticent to complete the questionnaire, or
interviewee’s suspicion as to the true purpose of the research.”
Although the impact of development was difficult for the researchers to attain, the
study’s focus on the diaspora associations is a critical start in understanding the character
of these associations. The relevance of the report is in the descriptive analysis on how
these associations are grouped. It also sheds light into the fragmentation that exists
among the Haitian class within the United States.
Moreover, Fagen et al. compares these associations in relation to the countries
Diasporas have adopted, in this case the United States and Canada. This comparison has

23

the future potential to assist Donor Countries in engaging Diasporas in a more cohesive
manner so as to affect development in their country of origin more positively.
To conclude, the study inclines that from a ‘developmental perspective,
individualistic approaches do not constitute effective development practice. With this
said, Diaspora projects would undoubtedly be more effective if groups with similar
objectives combined forces. However, Diaspora group associations cannot take the bulk
of the work and deliver services to Haiti where there is no infrastructure. What is
recommended is that groups not only engage each other in their adopted country, but also
in unison make attempts to approach their country of origin and host country alike.

Research	
  Design	
  
The objective of this paper is to explore Haiti’s Diaspora and Haitian
development since the transitional period that followed the fall of the Duvalier regime.
The paper will focus on Haiti’s social class structure and follow it to the diaspora
community in the United States. The hypothesis is that the Haitian Diaspora in the
United States has a negative impact on Haitian socio-political and economic
development.
Haitians in the United States left Haiti for a multitude of reasons, i.e. better living
conditions or for political persecution. Within the United States the Haitian Diaspora
politically organized with intentions of returning to Haiti. Prior to 1971, the single
purpose of most Haitian political groups in the Diaspora was the overthrow of the
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Duvalier regime.37

As poverty deepened and repression from the Duvalier regime

worsened, Haitians started to emigrate in droves. A new phase of migration from Haiti to
the US began in 1972 when several sailboats carrying Haitians arrived in South Florida.
The waves or phases of Haitian Diaspora settled into US life and culture with
different intentions.

These different intentions prompted the Diaspora to organize

socially and politically however with diverse objectives in relations to Haiti Proper. It is
this political and social chasm in the Haitian Diaspora that has negated any efforts of
aiding any of the socio-economic and political arenas of Haitian development.
Since the Duvalier-Aristide regime transition, Haiti’s civil society has been highly
praised for its efforts of bringing democracy to Haiti. However, the 14 years since the
momentous event divisions in the Haitian Diaspora are evidence that through huge
successes in Haiti this group’s contribution is an ‘invaluable socio-political and financial
asset for Haiti’.38
To guide the argument of this paper, the following questions will be discussed.
Why did the Haitian Diaspora start emigrating from Haiti? Why did they settle in the
United States? Were they defined through economic, social, or political attaches? How
did the phases of Haitian immigrants define the Haitian Diaspora in the United States?
Were there connections with Haitian civil society? How were they aiding Haiti politically
and socially? With what focus were political organizations first created? How were they
aiding Haiti economically? What major role did the Diaspora have in the elections of
1994? Was there a concerted effort to maintain democracy in Haiti and what role did the
37
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Diaspora play? Why did the focus of Haitian Diasporas change?
concerted efforts since Haitians voted for democracy?

Have there been

What role does the Haitian

Diaspora play today? Is it effective in Haiti as it is in the United State? What has been
the role of the U. S. Government in relation to the Haitian Diaspora?

	
  Variables	
  
I will be considering the historical developments of Haitian socio-political events
as well as the emigration movement of Haitians from 1960 to 2000. The timeframe of
the historical developments of Haiti will be one of my independent variables. The sociopolitical elements will be attained from studies produced, i.e. United States Citizen and
Immigration Services, articles, journals, and statistical information gathered.
The historical events of Haiti will help to outline the social and racial divide
created in that environment. The social cleavages in Haiti will be dependent variables.
After explaining the phases of Haitian emigration this will help to outline and identify the
how the Haitian Diaspora in the United States organizes through socio-political
associations.

Methodology	
  
For the purpose of this thesis, qualitative data will be employed. Both primary and
secondary sources will be used to demonstrate that Haiti indeed has a fragmented class
system created during its colonization period. Furthermore, this class system has existed
in much of the socio-political and economic history of Haiti and still does today.
Moreover, this approach will look to establish that the Haitian Diaspora has transplanted
the same social structures in the United States. As an active participator in Haitian
26

development, the social structures that affect the Haitian Diaspora have in turn affected
Haitian development negatively.

Chapter	
  Outline	
  
This paper will comprise of 5 Chapters. The first chapter of this paper has
introduced the argument that the Haitian Diaspora has had a negative impact on Haitian
socio-political and economic development. Within the context of international relations
the origins of the dependency framework will be reviewed, highlighting the rationale
behind the underdevelopment in Third World countries and more specifically in Haiti.
Chapter 2 will depict Haiti’s historical background leading to the first major
exodus of the Haitian Diaspora to the United States between the years of late 1950s to
2000. A look into these phases will explain how Haitians settled in the US and therefore
the mode of organization and purpose in Haitian development.
Chapter 3 will concentrate on the Haitian Diaspora in the United States. Lending
on ethnography approaches of immigration as a transnational process39 the study will
explain the way in which each wave of the Haitian Diaspora settled in the United States
and retained social and class fragmentation.
Chapter 4 will specifically take a look at the Duvalier-Aristide Regime change of
the early 1990s.

The significance of this period will help to further analyze the

Diaspora’s role and its affects by focusing on its role with a different regime under a
“new” political, economic and social structure. By looking at a more specific event in
Haiti this will further support my hypothesis that the Haitian Diaspora has negatively
affected Haitian social, political, and economic development.
39
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Chapter 5 will conclude my analysis and will help to better understand the role of
the Haitian Diaspora in Haiti’s socio-political and economic development. In conclusion,
this explanatory thesis will show that the fragmented group associations assisting in Haiti
have affected Haitian development (socio-politics and economics) negatively. Lastly,
several recommendations and afterthoughts will be included with the hope that this paper
will further expand developmental studies on Haiti’s problematique.

28

Chapter	
  2:	
  Relevant	
  Historical	
  Overview	
  
	
  
Haiti	
  
The Republic of Haiti, as it is formally known, is located in the western third of
the Island of Hispaniola. Haiti shares the island with the Dominican Republic and is
approximately, 650 miles (1, 048kilometers) from the coast of Florida in the United
States (Appendix 1)

The	
  Colony	
  
Christopher Columbus first encountered the island of Hispaniola in 1492. He
documented coming across natives, Arawaks, in the island, whom he colonized under the
auspices of the Spanish crown. Under the harsh new conditions, it did not take long until
the native population of Hispaniola found itself nearing extinction. The Spanish looked
to the trans-Atlantic slave trade to re-populate the island with “expendable manpower
with which to build forts, mine for gold, and clear and till the soil.”40 This act “began in
earnest in 1517; by 1540 some 30,000 Africans had been imported to Hispaniola.”41
While the Spanish occupied the eastern portion of Hispaniola, the French slowly took
control of the western most part of the island. After 200 years and having established a
profitable slave trade in the east, the Spanish officially ceded their western domain to the
France in 1697, who in turn, named it Saint Saint-Domingue.
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It is at this juncture, that the histories of both the Dominican Republic and the
Republic of Haiti diverge. For after Saint –Domingue was established, the French took
no time to initiate an agricultural venture intended to make it their jewel in the Caribbean.
Now recognized as Saint-Domingue, thus begins the story of the country that would
eventually become known as the Republic of Haiti.
With sugar cane farming as the focal point, the French created and maintained an
agricultural empire in Saint-Domingue. Sugar plantations required a sizable amount of
work, hands and labor. “Thus began in earnest the era of sugar slavery [and] in the 1700s
[became] a malevolent machine.”42 By the mid-1700s, Saint-Domingue was France’s
most affluent colony, “of all French possessions in the New World, the most significant
in terms of wealth procured for its metropolis and in terms of its influence on agriculture
and commerce.”43 “Saint-Domingue was the last of the great sugar isles to come into
production, and being last, was the most fertile and profitable.”44
Equally important to maintaining the status quo of the jewel colony, was the
French ambition of facilitating a well-organized society. The populous fitted well into
categories for the purpose of establishing order. According to the Eric Williams, SaintDomingue had 5 classes:
“The first was the planters, the big whites…the second was
the royal officials, the representative of the Exclusive, the
symbols of the denial of the self-governing institutions.
Then came the poor whites, the overseers, artisans,
professional men, hating the planters above, determined to
maintain the bridge that separated them for the men of color
below. Below them came the fourth class, the mulattos and
42
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free Negroes, numbering 28,000, possessing one-third of the
real estate and one-fourth of the personal property in the
colony, but denied social and political equality with the
whites. Finally, there were…the slaves; many of them only
recently arrived from Africa, the foundation on which the
prosperity and superiority of Saint-Domingue rested.”45

The	
  Revolution	
  
As one might have guessed, conditions of the slave population within the sugar
industry were absolutely brutal. As Landes describes, “it took a lot of work to grow
sugar cane, cut, crush it, and refine the juice: gang labor under a hot sky; dangerous,
hurried round-the-clock pressing, boiling, and skimming before the crops spoiled…In the
fields, men and women did the work of animals… No plows, few tools, everything by
hand.”46 Harsher were the inhumanities that the slave population had to endure. “Master
and overseers thought the blacks no better than brutes, and used stick and lash freely,
sometimes so freely as to maim and kill…and so on and on in a ceaseless round of
torment and humiliation.”47
The significance of the Haitian Revolution is that it dislodged Haiti from a system
of tyranny, if only for a while. The rest of the world was left aghast when France, with
its entire advanced military prowess, was made to yield its position. Although it took 13
years to realize this independence from France, the intricate details of the revolution
proves that there were many forces at work.
As news of the French Revolution reached Sain-Domaingue, an inspired
community of varying class distinctions began to organize. The French Revolution of

45

Farmer, Paul, The Uses of Haiti (Monroe, Common Courage Press, 2006), p. 58
Ibid, p. 116
47
Ibid, p. 118-119
46

31

1789 became “the spark that ignited them.”48 “At first, the dislodged link from French
rule saw an opportunity for the Saint-Domingue upper white class to gain[ed] control of
the new Colonial Assembly [thereby] excluding their economic competitors, the
mulattos, and the poor whites.”49 At the same time, these same groups resisted. With the
support “they found in a French abolitionist society, les Amis des Noirs,” the mulatto
group, consisting of “wealthy mulattos, initiated an open revolt against the status quo in
1791.”50
Although there was a common desire to break free from French rule, there was
also an understanding that maintaining a certain status quo was deemed necessary for a
continuation of supplying “three-fourths of the world’s sugar.”51 Until 1791, the slave
populous “had served chiefly as pawns, with both white and mulatto factions recruiting
slave armies-in-waiting.”52

In August 1791, the slaves revolted. “Armed with picks,

machetes, clubs, and torches, they razed approximately 180 sugar plantations, and
perhaps 900 plantations of coffee, cotton, and indigo.”53
Toussaint Louverture led the slave revolts and led with such skill that worried the
other societal classes in Saint-Domingue, but also challenged the power of the French
Army. He “introduced guerilla tactics to the slave army,” which allowed him to continue
to gain support and continue to build an army from the slave inhabitants of SaintDomingue.54 After several years of tactical fighting against the French army, “Toussaint

48

Farmer, Paul, The Uses of Haiti (Monroe, Common Courage Press, 2006), p. 59
Ibid, p. 59
50
Ibid, p. 59
51
Ibid, p. 56
52
Ibid, p. 60
53
Ibid, p. 60
54
Ibid, p. 60
49

32

named himself “Lieutenant Governor of the colonial state, Saint Domingue, within the
French Empire.”55

With such a desire to break free from French control, why include

himself into the French empire? Well, as stated by Farmer:
Toussaint’s goal was nothing less than the restoration of the
colony’s economic prosperity-without slavery. Somewhat
surprisingly, his plans did not involve changing the
plantation basis of production. Instead, he planned to
replace slavery with a system of contract labor enforced by
a gendarmerie.56
Toussaint’s effort to restore Saint-Domingue to its jewel status without slavery
was never realized. Although there is much speculation on how this occurred, Toussaint
was captured and killed by the French army. Jean-Jacques Dessalines, a disciple and
fellow combatant “led and carried on an armed struggle against the French.”57
Intertwined within the events of the Haitian Revolution is the way in which the
power politics played out in the 13 years of the revolution. The battle to gain control over
Saint-Domingue was not only against France but also amongst its Creole and slave
population. Michel-Rolph Trouillot examines a certain portion of the last 2 years of the
Revolution to include yet another faction, in what he called a “war within the war.” He
lends to the intricate details of the revolution that highlight oscillating decisions of
generals and revolutionaries.
After the eventual capturing and death of Touissant Lourveture, Trouillot
mentions that there was essentially two campaigns occurring: 1) the one led by black
officers reintegrated under Leclerc’s command against the former slaves who had refused
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to surrender to the French, and 2) the generals and the free colored officers associated
with Petion against the former slaves who refused to acknowledge the revolutionary
hierarchy and the supreme authority of Dessalines.58
The significance of this faction in the Haitian Revolution and to Trouillot’s
argument is that the different powers at play between the revolutionaries “introduced
dissidence.”
Dessalines, who before Trouillot died was still under his leadership, and therefore
still ‘under the French banner’ was in fact fighting former slave forces who refused to
surrender to France and also against the smaller former slave dissident groups. The
leader of these dissident groups and another significant factor in the outcome of the
Haitian revolution, as Trouillot acknowledges, is Colonel Jean-Baptiste San Souci.
Formerly a Bossale slave under the colonial system, San Souci became the leader
of the sustained resistance of the various dissident groups (composed mainly of
Africans).59 Dessalines along with free colored, mulatto General Alexandre Petion were
fighting to quell San Souci-led dissident groups. Although they did not capture San
Souci, by November 1802, Dessaline, Petion and Christophe forged an alliance against
the French.60
As military leader Dessaline lead “a scorched-earth approach to battle,” it proved
successful as he carried on the battle until winning control of Saint-Domingue from the
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French. On the first of January 1804, the island’s new leaders reclaimed its Indian name,
Haiti.61
After three centuries of slavery, fatal deforestation to the land, and a decade of
brutal fighting, the new Republic of Haiti had more than the lion share to rebuild itself as
a country. Furthermore, it had to revive an economy that had been neglected for a decade
and all the while establishing itself as the first black governed country and only second
self-liberated country in the Americas, from its colonizers. Recovery from these factors
has proven to be complex. But first, they had to deal with their class struggle.
At the end of the revolution and at the beginning of independence, Dessalines
ruled an authoritarian Haiti. He drafted a constitution, which was intended to mark
Haiti’s departure from the regional status quo… and at the same time an asylum for
escaped slaves.62 However the years that followed for Haiti, were years of obstacles that
proved to be too complex.
Two years after Dessalines declared himself ‘first emperor of Haiti,’ he was
assassinated. This marked a successive in-fighting amongst generals and elites. Generals
of the Haitian Revolution, Christophe and Petion, claimed the throne. Out of this rivalry
there was a faction that remained strong in the north led by Christophe and a Petion-led
faction in the south.63

Haiti remained divided until Jean Pierre Boyer reunited the

country in 1818.
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Despite the factions and changing of powers, there remained the question of
‘economic priority of its citizens.’ Soon after the Haitian Revolution, as anthropologist
Paul Farmer framed it:
The division reintroduced the inequalities of the colonial
system, replacing the gulf between master and slave with a
gap between those whose interests led toward participation
in the global economy and those who saw more advantage
in keeping a safe distance from it. The new elite insisted
that the emerging peasantry produce commodities for an
international market, but the peasants-former slaves-wished
to be left alone to grow foodstuffs for themselves and for
local markets.64
In the end, the elite managed to coerce the situation so that Haiti started producing
sugar and rum. “Thus the plantation status quo reorganized itself anew in Haiti,” notes
Benitez-Rojo, “although under other work and power relations.”65
Haiti as the first black independent country did not fare well in the world system.
It was essentially ostracized from the economic world market; an effort led by France and
other European powers alike, including the United States.

The first years after

independence, no foreign credit institution lent money to Haiti.66 Unrecognized as a
country, Haiti sought trading partners to gain sustainability in the world market. Haiti
became the source of advantageous trade deals, particularly for the British, but also
became a chief trading partner with the United States, although the US did not recognized
Haiti until 1862.67
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On the home front Haiti was not faring any better. Intermediaries who bulked and
or processed the produce of small landholders linked the way in which Haiti sold its
commodities on the world market.68 Farmer best describes the result of this operation:
“Such restrictions were a spatial isolation of the peasantry,
not just from the outside world,” but from the other classes
inside Haiti a well… “The economic structures, the very
mechanisms of extracting this surplus, made it possible to
bleed this peasantry without ever touching or seeing it.”
These feudal structures have endured to the present day.
The chief bleeders of the peasantry were the State and the
small commercial class it came to represent.”69
The economic environment that was created was highly unstable. This proved to
be true, during the Geffrard government (1859-1867) when the country was starting to
show signs of unrest among its population. Eventually, unrest did emerge amongst the
‘urban poor, the small-scale merchants, the market women, the unemployed and the
progressive sector of the middle class…and later by the business community.70 To stave
off the rioting that already had seized Port-au Prince, “the Geffrard government became
the first Haitian administration openly to obtain foreign aid to remain in power.”71

American	
  Occupation	
  
In the years that followed into the Twentieth century, Haiti fared no better. The
Geffrard government set the precedent. The United States Marine Corps invaded Haiti in
1915.72 Why did the US invade? The pretext for the U.S. intervention was “instability”
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in Haiti.73 Others would claim, in order to preserve the integrity of the Monroe
Doctrine.74
The US-Haitian treaty that followed in 1915, granted the United States complete
political and administrative control over Haiti.75 In the 19 years that the United States
occupied Haiti, the practices and consequences of those practices left Haiti in a complete
fragmented state not only amongst their government, but their economy as well as their
social class structure.

Amongst these practices was: 1) A US-written constitution that

overturned laws preventing foreigners from owning land, thus enabling US corporations
to take what they want, 2) Consistently suppressed local democratic institutions and
denied elementary political liberties, 3) Established a foreign-dominated plantation
agriculture, which destroyed the existing mini-fundia land-tenure system with its myriad
peasant freeholders, 4) Concept of racial discrimination thus reinforcing the internal
class/race oppression from the days of French colonialism.76
Equally important, the US occupation: 1) Augmented the peasantry’s forced
contribution to the maintenance of the State, 2) Centralized the Haitian army and
disarmed the provinces, putting in place the structures of military, fiscal, and commercial
centralization,77 and 3) The national finances were still controlled by the US officials, and
the Banque Nationale remained a subsidiary of the US Export-Import Bank.78
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Once the United States left in 1934, ‘Haiti remained firmly in the US orbit.’79

The	
  Duvalier	
  Regime	
  
After the US occupation, an indigeniste movement, which attempted to elevate
Haitian culture as a nationalist response, spread through the nation. From this movement
of ‘extreme color consciousness, Francois Duvalier declared himself a noiriste (a partisan
of the blacker citizens, rather than the lighter urban elites).80
Francois Duvalier assumed office on 22 October 1957.81

Rod Prince

characterized Duvalier’s rule in two stages, ‘the early years’ and the ‘second stage.’ In
his early years, Duvalier neutralized the major possible sources of opposition: the army,
the Roman Catholic Church, the United States embassy, the business elite, political
parties and trade unions.82

Phase	
  One	
  
To counter the army’s assuming control of the state, Duvalier created a volunteer
army, Volunteers for National security (VSN). This militia, responsible only to Duvalier
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was soon dubbed the tontons macoutes as they effectively managed to neutralize the
army.83 The VSN also effectively nullified all political parties. To counter the Roman
Catholic Church, Duvalier had all members of the church removed.84 Although the
Catholic Church and Duvalier reconciled officially through an accord in 1966, Duvalier
continued his witch-hunt on the other orders in the following years.
To quell the concerns of the United States, Duvalier guaranteed to look out for US
interests, which was good enough to deserve Washington’s support.85

All other

institutions were either severely hindered (controlled) or silenced.

Phase	
  Two	
  
The second stage of Duvalier’s institution started in 1963 when an attempted coup
led by a former VSN member almost succeeded. In continuing phase two, Duvalier “was
able to negotiate from strength, reaching an accommodation with certain of these groups
which would allow them to pursue their sectional interests on the understanding that the
supreme power remained with Duvalier.”86 Scrutinizing the way in which he planned,
played, or eliminated opponents, many have coined this as the ‘Duvalierist Revolution.’
Subsequently, Duvalier’s first order of business was to institutionalize the Tontons
Macoute.
Just the way he managed to throw bishops and priests out of Haiti at one time
only to strike a deal with the Holy Sea a couple of years later with the condition that he
has the ‘right to fill vacant bishoprics with clerics of his own choice is incredible.
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With a hand-picked clergy, Duvalier was able to influence the ‘church-controlled
educational system’ to ‘aid the renewal and preservation of the class from which Duvalier
drew his support.’87 In politics, Duvalier ‘curtailed political pretensions of the mulatto
elite but touched few of their economic interests.’88
Most important part of phase two was making his support base a ‘lasting force.’
As mentioned before, Duvalier was a noiriste and as such he wanted to uplift the black
population of Haiti. This cohort consisted of the ‘black urban middle class, the mediumsized peasant landowners and those peasants dependent on them.’89 These groups were
rewarded in different ways to assist in maintaining Duvalier’s grasp of the country.
-‐

Urban middle class: rewarded with an increased role in the bureaucracy

-‐

Peasant landowners and their followers: brought into the power structure
(VSN) and given new opportunities for authority and enrichment. They had
authority over he peasantry in their districts.

-‐

Peasantry: called up to the army (for the first time) and given local power and
rights.90

Phase	
  Three	
  
Although Prince mentioned two phases in Duvalier’s permanency in power, a
third is in order. This phase would be completed however upon his death the permanency
of the Duvalier regime would begin to fall apart.
Before dying (21 April 1971), Francois Duvalier initiated the third phase of his
regime. Duvalier installed his 19-year-old son Jean-Claude to succeed him as president.
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After Duvalier’s death and Jean-Claude at the head of the state, power struggle amongst
three groups within the ruling family emerged in Haiti. These three groups were the ‘old
guard Duvalierists, modernizers, and the newer commercial mulatto elite.’
Jean-Claude ‘shifted his power base from the black middle class to the mulatto
business community.’91 This shift included Jean-Claude becoming ‘wholly dependent on
US economic aid and political goodwill.’92
The Jean-Claude government marked a lot of changes, one of which the
relationship with the United States. Where in Francois’ affiliation with the United States
was an agreement (mainly not falling to the communists and protecting private American
citizens and American property interests in Haiti); with Jean-Claude it became a
relationship of dependence on the United States and the business elite to maintain his
power.

Haitian	
  Diaspora	
  (1960s	
  –	
  Present)	
  	
  
The diaspora of Haiti is considered an ‘active diaspora,’ meaning a diaspora that
maintains its relationships with the homeland in real and not simply in symbolic terms.93
In relation to geographic proximity, economic and political history the Haitian people
who would come to be known as the Haitian Diaspora migrated and settled chiefly in
North America. It was only after Francois Duvalier assumed the presidency and started to
quell all opposition (middle class and upper class), such as political parties, trade unions,
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student organizations, the press, and the church, that Haitians began to arrive in the
United States. At the end of the 29 years of the Duvalier Regime 225,00094 foreign-born
Haitians resided in the United States. What is understood or generally accepted is that
with the migration of Haitian nationals the largest concentration is in the United States
and that this resettlement occurred in waves.
The first and second wave of Haitians started arriving in the United States in the
1960s.

Although not in large numbers, this wave consisted of doctors, teachers,

intellectuals, and other skilled workers as well as those escaping persecution that were the
first to go. As president, John Fitzgerald Kennedy actively encouraged Haitian refugees
to come to the United States.95

The U.S. consular officers readily approved

nonimmigrant Haitian visas and virtually all of these immigrants arrived in the U.S.
legally via airplane and settled in the northeastern United States.96 Aside from being part
of the elite class in Haiti another shared commonality was the want to see the Duvalier
regime overthrown for them to return to their country.97
Although its been identified that there were essentially two waves of Haitians into
the United States, Michel Laguerre identifies three types.

All based on different

economic standing in Haiti as well as in the United States, the first wave (1957-1964) of
Haitians in the US were of the Haitian elite and staunchly opposed Duvalier and
emigrated with the intent to return after Duvalier’s fall. The second wave (1965 – 1971)
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were the middle – class of Haiti. And, the third wave (1972 -) which continued [well into
until 2004] “consisting mostly of boatloads of undocumented refugees headed toward
Miami” (Laguerre1998: 86).
In December 1972, a group of Haitian refugees landed on the shores of Miami in
a flimsy craft after braving the high seas.98 This single act marked the beginning of yet
another wave of the Haitian Diaspora. The 1970s saw a significant in-flow of Haitians
arriving on the Florida shores of the US. However, it was not until 1981 that it reached
its peak, “up to 1,000 people a month continued to arrive in Florida.”99 Statistics showed
that between 1971 and 1977, fifty to seventy thousand Haitians arrived by boat in South
Florida.100
When Jean-Claude Duvalier was ousted in 1986, a semblance of political and
human rights peeked through the years of repression.

The political landscaped

momentarily changed and so the flow of Haitians migrating to the United States
diminished. A resurgence of socio-political activity ascended Jean-Bertrand Aristide to
lead Haiti in what everyone thought would be Haitian development. However, this was
temporary as political in-fighting within the country sparked political repression and
violence.

Eventually, the flow of Haitians migrating to Haiti, legally or illegally,

continued.
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When the government officially transitioned from the Duvalier regime to the
Aristide presidency in 1994, Aristide called upon the “tenth department” – the émigrés –
to help rehabilitate Haitian infrastructure.
In the 10 years that followed, Haiti has seen two presidents (Aristide 2nd term;
Preval 2 terms), political parties (oppositions), and a semblance of democratic
governance, foreign aid, and development aid. And certainly, Haiti has not been without
a coup, a stand-off, more inflow of Haitians via boats to the shores of Florida, and chaos
breaking out again in 2004.

However, in the midst of these 10 years, where Haiti has

experienced a more open government that is willing to work for developing Haiti, how
has the diaspora contributed? How has the Diasporas organized politically to help Haiti?
Has the Diasporas’ assistance aided development in Haiti? Was aid focused on bringing
change to the political front or economic front? Was it substantial enough to help
development move forward in Haiti? And, lastly has the Diaspora’s assistance in Haiti
impacted Haiti positively or negatively?
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Chapter	
  3:	
  Haitian	
  Diaspora	
  in	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  
In the earlier days of the Haitian migration to the United States the diaspora
maintained a transnational activity in the form of remittances. “Defined as the transfer of
money or goods, sent by the migrants and received by individuals who, generally, are
family members of these migrants, remittances were an important means of support
throughout the Duvalier era and continues to be today.”101 This chapter will briefly
discuss remittances and how the changing political environment in Haiti then changed to
other forms of diasporic support. Focus will be given to the varying waves of foreignborn Haitian Diaspora and the different methods of support since the Duvalier-Aristide
transition and beyond.

The popular movement that emerged in Haiti during the late-1980s, sparked
renewed vigor in the American sector of the Haitian diaspora.

Aristide’s popular

movement “Lavalas Operations” and eventually the Lavalas Organization, unified Haiti
and had a far reaching effect across national lines and well into the United States. It reinvigorated the Haitian Diaspora to such an extent that both the socio-political and
economic efforts of the Diaspora began taking on a different and significant form both in
the United States as well as in Haiti. These new forms of diasporic support also required
innovative notions of reorganization in order to fit into the new democratically elected
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popular government.

The Haitian Diaspora refocused its remittances through

organizations (political and non-political) and associations.
Several events in the early 1990s brought attention to the significant number of
Haitian immigrants in the United States and their potential to organize. Some of these
events include the April 20, 1990, march from Grand Army Plaza in Brooklyn across the
Brooklyn Bridge to Wall Street. “This march brought thousands of orderly but insistent
Black people together in order to protest a decision by the Center for Disease Control that
proposed Haitians (and West Africans) be forbidden from donating their blood to blood
banks.”102
Similarly in their potential to organize and more to the diaspora’s potential to
assist Haiti, the diaspora responded by forming hundreds of small meetings, parties, and
all sorts of appeals in order to help Aristide counter the Washington-supported opponent,
Marc Bazin.
“Aristide’s victory on December 16, 1990 produced an
outburst of joy both in Haiti and in the diaspora. The coup
against Aristide on September 30, 1991, was followed by
immediate protests in Washington, Miami, Boston, Montreal
and New York, with a major protest in New York
announced for Friday, Oct. 11. In the words of the New
York Times, "... the police had not expected such a large
turnout -- even though the 300,000 members of the Haitian
community in New York have shown a readiness to voice
their political concerns." (NY Times, October 12, 1991)”103
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The Haitian Diaspora’s display of mass demonstrations in these two events
opened a dialogue within the international community on the Haitian Diaspora potential
to playing a role in Haitian development. Jean-Bertrand Aristide also questioned the
Diaspora’s potential, but acted on this by creating a diaspora ministry:
“One of the earliest examples of a diaspora ministry in the
developing world is Haiti's Ministry of Haitians Living
Abroad (MHLA). Created in 1995, the ministry aims to
encourage the participation of diaspora communities in
technical and professional activities to advance Haiti's
development efforts. The ministry informs the diaspora of
local realities and changes in Haiti and encourages the
diaspora to return to and invest in the country.”104
Before these massive demonstrations and since the first wave of the Haitian
Diaspora, foreign-born Haitians were assisting their home country beyond remittances.
As the years continued, remittances increased but also the dynamics of contributions to
Haiti changed.
In the 1960s, the number of foreign-born Haitians in the United States was
relatively small with 4, 816 foreign-born Haitians (Appendix 2). However, since the
1970s and onwards, that has increasingly grown by leaps and bounds in the United States
doubling with each new decade since. By 1990, there was a population of 225,000
foreign-born Haitians residing in the United States. That number again doubled in the
year 2000 to 419,000. This is significant in that as the diaspora grew in the United States
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the consistency and amount of remittances being sent to Haiti increased as well
(Appendix 3).

A disaggregate look into the 1990 US Census (Appendix 2) on the 225,000
foreign-born Haitians shows that this cohort had a labor force of 156,000 (1990 US
Census), a cohort that potentially contributes remittance.

In 1990 the number of

remittances reached levels of over $300 million USD, surpassing the levels reached in the
1980s, which steadily remained at approximately $100 million USD. In the following
decades, the foreign-born Haitian population again doubled and so did the estimates of
remittance contributions, reaching well over $500 million USD in the year 2000.105
Haitians have settled in many parts of the United States; however the largest
concentrations of the Haitian Diaspora reside in Florida, New York and Massachusetts,
respectively. As of 2008, there were 535,000 foreign-born Haitians living in the United
States, with the highest concentrations in Florida (183,108, or 34.2 percent of the total
Haitian-born population), New York (159,444, or 29.8 percent), and Massachusetts
(34,757, or 6.5 percent).106 With the steady increase in remittance being sent to Haiti as
the population of foreign-born Haitians continued to grow. In the United States it has
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become clear that the transnational activity of remittance flows has created an ‘active
diaspora.’

Remittances:	
  The	
  Economic	
  Impact	
  on	
  Haiti	
  
“Remittance is defined as the transfer of money or goods, sent by the migrants
and received by individuals who, generally, are family members of these migrants.107
Migrants sending remittances do it to help “meet basic family needs including health care
and education;” after those responsibilities are fulfilled, they may contribute to housing
improvements and eventually land purchase.108

The country where immigrants are

sending money from is called sending country and the country receiving remittances is
called a receiving country or labor-sending country.
In the context of Haiti, prior to 1970 there was no record to show the flow of
remittances entering Haiti from the United States and less showing their impact. Since
1970, however it was recorded that an estimated $18 million USD (Appendix 3) were
flowing into Haiti from the United states, steadily increasing until reaching levels
upwards of $106 million USD in the 1980s.109 Research on the impact of these
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remittances in Haiti during this time is insufficient, but initial findings told that the
supplemental resource of income did go to fulfill the basic needs of a household.
Surveys in New York and Miami in the late nineties revealed that 90 percent of
Haitians remit money back to Haiti, averaging just over $100 per month.110 With these
statistics it was starting to become clear that remittances were an important ‘external
input into the Haitian economy.’ In 2001, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)
estimated that 24.2 percent of Haiti’s GDP came from remittances.111
In the mid-nineties, research on the receiving country, in this case Haiti started to
look at the affects of remittances, mainly looking at the undertakings of the
individuals/households when receiving remittances. In Itzigsohn’s study on Migrant
Remittances, Labor Markets, and Household Strategies, findings in Haiti (Port-auPrince), suggested that remittances supplement a household’s well being, however,
“those that receive remittances are the better off among the poor.” The study seemed to
negate most of Itzigsohn’s claims on remittance impact on households. For instance,
although emigrating was pervasive in Haiti, households with higher human capital were
more likely to receive remittances.

Itzigsohn’s hypothesis that head-of-households

receiving remittances do not participate in the local labor market complied, however, did
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not corroborate with the amount of income that was being generated aside from
remittances. This only proves that the Haitian labor economy is informal.112
In 2003, the Migrant Policy Institute (MPI) stated that although their (remittances)
“are an important source of income for many developing countries, they are extremely
difficult to measure.” This is often due to the different ways in which Diasporas sent
remittances back to the receiving country. In fact, there is much to say about the informal
way that remittances are sent. Remittances are estimates at best and so it is safe to
assume that the way they are impacting households can only be a presumption. One
thing is known for sure and that is that ‘remittances from the United States are
particularly important to countries of the Caribbean. The Inter-American Development
Bank (IDB) estimates that over three-quarters of remittances originate in the United
States.113
The difficulty in assessing impact through individual remittance contributions has
prompted research on other methods of contribution. Migrant organizations are another
way remittance contributions reach Haiti.

These organizations consist of Haitian

volunteers/members who are “dedicated to addressing unmet needs and contribute to
communities.”114 These “collective remittances support initiatives in their country of
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origin; they are collective because migrants do so with the intention of having a collective
impact, and are themselves organized for collective action.”115
Haiti’s diaspora contributes collective remittances through three types of
organizations or associations. These are hometown associations (HTAs), professionbased associations and church-based organizations. These types of organizations all
assist within different capacities and focus in different sectors where Haiti’s government
lacks the capacity to deliver services.

Migrant	
  Organizations	
  and	
  Associations	
  	
  
The collective action of migrant organizations to contribute remittances to Haiti is
more generally known as Home Town Associations (HTAs). Satisfying the HTA criteria
are a great many student organizations along with large and small non-profit
organizations, local US community organizations and centers existing around the US.
“These associations have been important vehicles both for maintaining Haitian identity in
the new country and affirming loyalties to their country of origin.”116 These social
groups support many projects abroad in Haiti as well as within the US diaspora
community. An initial look into the number of organizations operating in the US with the
focus of assisting Haiti and registered under the charity & non-profit code (501c3) is
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numbered at 846 organizations as of January 2011.117 The exact figure on the number of
organizations spearheaded by foreign-born Haitians alone does not exist. However,
identifying their impact through collective remittances has shown that association or
organization supported projects focus on ‘addressing unmet needs in specific geographic
locations.’ They also tend to assist in places where a member of the association has a
specific link to a Haitian community.118
In 2005, music artist and producer Wyclef Jean started Yele Haiti. The mission of
this organization is to assist with the “process of dialogue, an engagement of all factions
present in Haiti119 and to fully engage the diaspora in supporting this process and to
provide aid and assistance to the Haitian communities in greatest need.”120
Since its inception, Yele Haiti has focused on education, entrepreneurship,
community development, health and environment and most recently emergency relief.
Its high profile status has allowed it to engage the diaspora for support with resources and
secure local and international financial and political support. Local Haitian communities
(mainly in Port-au-Prince and Gonaives) embrace this organization and the work that has
been done and future projects to come.
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Many other less well-known HTAs operate in much of the same way although
they don’t have the star power or the backing of international non-governmental
organizations (INGOs). The small-scale projects that are initiated in Haiti generally deal
with education, health and infrastructure. In order to begin most of these projects,
sources of funding come from the members themselves to start-up projects in a small
rural community (that diaspora may or may not have a link to).

Usually these

communities are difficult to get to and the small HTA operating in that community may
be the only assistance that is in the area.

Professional	
  Associations	
  and	
  Church	
  Organizations	
  
In order to assist Haiti, the Haitian Diaspora also comes together through
professional groups and church organizations. These two types of group associations are
far more reputable and with larger membership. Overall the “professional organizations
[who] are comprised of better educated and wealthier members than either of the two
categories.”121 Most recognized amongst these professional organizations is the:
Association des Medecins Haitiens a l’Etranger, AMHE.
Founded in 1972 and founded 8 more chapters by 1980 in
other US states. AMHE works in collaboration with the
Ministry of Health. Its activities include raising medical
standards in the major hospitals, training Haitian physicians,
and mounting campaigns to reduce HIV/AIDS and Malaria.
The government of Haiti has also given AMHE a customs
franchise that allows it to ship medical supplies to the
country duty free. (Customs duties are a continuing problem
for other organizations, and it is not clear whether they are
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unable to negotiate similar arrangement or prefer not to do
so.)122
Professional associations operate in much the same way as HTAs. However,
because of a larger pool of funding sources they operate with a “more elaborate
organizational and communication structures.”123 Their capacity to fund projects of their
liking (usually in the health sector) is due to their expansive network that professional
associations are able to create. They usually have different chapters of the associations
not only in one city but several cities in the United States, and it may not necessarily be a
city that has a large Haitian Diaspora population.
Churches are among the oldest institutions to which Haitian migrants belong to,
with the most visible and important religious institution being the Haitian Catholic
Church.124 Nearly 75 percent of recent Haitian immigrants in South Florida reported in
1985 that they attended church at lease weekly.125 The contributions and work in Haiti
from church organizations is primarily geared towards education, school building and
disaster relief. Most if not all of the funding for these projects come from a large faithbased community. More importantly it is an exponentially growing community of faithbased diaspora membership with the increase of Haitian émigrés into the US and settling
into Haitian Diaspora communities.
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An increase in HTAs, professional and faith-based organizations in 1995, with the
focus of assisting Haiti, surged collective remittances (by 2000 $578 million USD).
INGOs began to take notice of the untapped development-assistance potential in the
Haitian Diaspora. In 2008, a study commissioned by the IDB was conducted on Haitian
Diaspora organizations and associations in the US (specifically New York City, Miami,
and Boston) and Canada to gauge the impact of their assistance in Haiti. In the report’s
findings, the amount of commitment, money, and influence that these associations and
organizations are giving is unquestionable.

However, the research found many

inconsistencies to fully support the claim that through associations and organizations the
Haitian Diaspora was conducting assistance that would be favorable to Haitian
development. In fact, the results from the surveys conducted showed that most of the
inconsistencies in developmental aid were due to the fragmented nature of US-based
Haitian Diaspora associations and organizations.
Among HTAs alone very little collaboration exists between the smaller and larger
and resource-heavy organizations within the US. One possible reason given by the
author of this report suggested “probably the major reason is that HTA projects are
created by closely related individuals who wish to make their own mark and do not seek
partnerships with other inclined individuals.”126
Not all professional associations have the capacity to assist in the way that AMHE
or Yele Haiti can. For instance, the Haitian American Nurses Association (HANA)
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provides Nurse training services in Haiti. The members “carry out their own missions in
Haiti by using their own salaries to do the work they have agreed to do.”127 On the same
note, with the added presence of the mushrooming number of HTAs many organizations
are struggling to simply obtain basic resources that are necessary to operate, even on a
very small scale in Haiti.
It was found that although there is a large Church-based diaspora community, the
projects with schools (building, supplying, etc) are constantly ‘struggling against odds’ to
complete or maintain. Moreover, if the church-funded schools are operating ‘they may or
may not follow a government curriculum.’ “And more often than not lack appropriate
teachers and equipment to cover more than basic learning.”128
Overall, the finding on the impact of these associations and organizations on
Haiti, ‘have been at least modestly effective in contributing to systemic improvements
that only a few are likely to be sustainable over the long term.’129

Political	
  Organization	
  within	
  the	
  US	
  	
  
Aristide’s advent to the political scene in Haiti and his welcoming request for
Haitian Diaspora support sealed the transcontinental political relation. The start of the
changing government landscape in Haiti (1986) and its openness welcomed an equally
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diversified political environment in the US. The multitude of political parties that sprang
up or came out of hiding in Haiti, more specifically in the US, have created a unique
dynamic on Haitian-US relations and Haitian politics.
The political organizations of the early 1960s, headed (usually) by elite exiles of
the Haitian Diaspora, were focused on either emigrating with the hopes of returning once
the Duvalier government toppled or on actions to over-throw the Duvalier government. It
has been documented that Haitians (exile) such as Bernard Sansaricq organized annual
invasions of Haiti over the course of almost two decades.130 No attempt was ever
successful because the opposition’s movement lacked a strong and well-organized base in
Haiti.131While waiting for either event to occur, political relations were more a state-tostate function, and at the local level the Haitian Diaspora was a somewhat united front
waiting for the fall of the Duvalier regime.
Since the 1970s the Diaspora’s political efforts, in the United States and aside
from its efforts to overthrow the Duvalier regime, started to focus on realizing the more
humane treatment of and allowing entry to Haitian refugees entering via US waters.
Approximately three decades of legal battles with the United States government on the
status and rights of Haitian refugees helped to build a significantly cohesive diaspora
body politic. Groups such as churches and liberal organizations lobbied and used the
courts to obtain better treatment for the new refugees.132 Several American institutions
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such as the Ford Foundation and the Congressional Black Caucus133 have a history of
continuously assisting Haitian organizations such as the Haitian Refugee Center (HCR).
Immediately after the fall of the Duvalier dictatorship of 1986, a long awaited
opportunity presented itself to the Haitian Diaspora. Exiled Haitians returned to Haiti
and some returned with political hopes. Exiles, like Bernard Sansaricq, returned with the
hopes of having their party represented in the new political forum of Haiti and
presidential candidacy.134
It was the grassroots initiative that supported Jean-Bertrand Aristide and that
support culminated with the Haitian Diaspora of the United States. By the time Aristide
emerged as the new president in Haiti, the diaspora was an important political entity in
the United States. The significance of the diaspora’s support for Aristide and the battle
fought by the diaspora to return him to Haiti proved that the diaspora belonged in Haiti’s
new political forum.
Since that time, the added factor of the Diaspora in Haitian homeland politics of
Haiti has been marred with problems. Not specifically because of the Haitian Diaspora
but certainly the added “presence of the returnees in town and periodic visits of members
of the diaspora made things more complicated.”135 Such complications Laguerre claims
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are the various forms in which individuals from the Haitian Diaspora interact with
Haitian homeland politics. “Among the most productive are those that involve direct
interaction with the Haitian electorate and the political establishment…also productive
are actions carried out in the United States by the diaspora on behalf of the Haitian
government or the Haitian people at large.”136
The added complication of the diaspora in Haitian politics culminates in a list by
Laguerre (1998):
-‐
-‐

-‐

The financial resources of the diaspora are an important asset (Haitian elite no
longer have the financial leverage they once held in Haiti);
Diaspora also participates in island politics by contacting US Congressmen and
form, voluntary and grassroots organizations for favors on behalf of Haiti…
Members of the diaspora have been able to introduce their presidential candidates
to US politicians and to members of Congress.
Since Diaspora sends remittances back home, they can influence the votes of their
relatives and friends.137

Haitian	
  Diaspora	
  Political	
  Outlet	
  through	
  Media	
  	
  
The Haitian print weeklies and the radio programs have maintained the
transnational connection of the Haitian Diaspora to Haiti. The founding of these weeklies
delineates the successive support systems in the diasporic community. Much of the way
the weeklies came about follows the Haitian Diaspora and the Duvalier-Aristide
trajectory in Haiti.

Where the first weekly to come out, Haiti Obervateur (1971),

staunchly opposed the Duvalier government, the weeklies that followed Haiti Progres
and Haiti en Marche, respectively, were weeklies that portrayed Haiti’s new and versatile
new political actors, an army that found itself in a new environment and without a script
to follow as before.)
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political forum. Today the three competing weeklies, Haiti Observateur, Haiti Progres,
and Haiti en Marche, continue to keep the diaspora abreast of all of the happenings
within the diaspora community and abroad. However, with the changed environment and
tools of media in general, there are far many different ways to receive information from
abroad and vice versa.
Radio has always been the ‘optimum medium of communication’ for Haitians in
Haiti, and in the diaspora community it’s much the same.138 Radio transmissions to the
diaspora community in the US started in 1972 with L’Heure Haitienne, a weekly political
program. Since then the number of radio programs have increased and so have the type
of programs that are transmitted. Aside from the news, music, and event information
radio transmission has served ‘foremost [as a] vehicle for political activism.’139 Much
like the assemblage of thousands of Haitian Diaspora in the events of protestations
against the CDC and Aristide support, these gathering were ‘assembled through radio
announcements, with only a day’s notice.’140

Conclusion	
  
This chapter identified the various ways in which the Haitian Diaspora has
maintained a transnational connection to Haiti.

The physical distance has been no

essential factor into how much influence the diaspora has in their homeland.

So

connected are the diaspora to Haiti and vice versa, that even members of this community
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that lived outside of Haiti for the better part of their lives have been able to re-insert
themselves through Haitian development, socio-political and economic platforms.
Individuals from the diaspora community like, Dumarsais Simeus, a naturalized US
citizen and self-made millionaire, have been involved in HTAs for many years in the US,
help channel financial and other resources in organizations like Yele Haiti. His efforts
culminated in an attempt to run in the Haitian elections of 2005. Many other exiles in the
US returned to Haiti to serve as civil servants in the Haitian government (Haiti
Observateur founder and supporter of Yele Haiti and uncle to Wyclef Jean, Raymond
Joseph, the Haitian Ambassador to the United States).
It’s safe to say that the Haitian Diaspora in the US is an influential powerhouse in
political and economic platforms with in Haiti, and that moreover, have been sealed with
the backing of the United States government. The transnational importance of this
phenomenon is creating a dependency that would seem to be co-dependent. But, is it
really? Why has Haiti still managed to rank amongst the low human development
countries?
In 2006, already 12 years since Aristide’s installation back into the presidential
seat (1994), Haiti ranked at 146 on the United Nations Development Program’s (UNDP)
human development index (HDI) with one of the highest rates of child mortality (Haiti is
currently 72 per 1,000 live births)141 in the western hemisphere, the highest incidence of
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HIV/AIDS, as well as the highest poverty index142 in the Caribbean. Granted
development has never been without its complications. And with Haiti’s checkered past
including over 200 years of slavery, being generally ostracized by the world community
at large, and repeatedly suffering invasion after invasion, which are controlled by a
powerful and developed country that lies a mere 800 miles away, development will
certainly be a challenge.
The addition of the Haitian Diaspora as a major force in Haiti’s development
process (as seen in the last 12 years) is uncertain. Doubtful because there has been a
common denominator in Haitian history that the diaspora has transplanted and
perpetuated as its been involved in the Haitian developmental process. The common
denominator is the fragmented social structures that plague Haiti proper. The Haitian
Diaspora has managed to allow this fragmentation to seep into the Haitian community in
the United States. Furthermore, it appears as though the diaspora has also become the
vehicle of re-inserting and establishing a more viable core-periphery relation between the
United States and Haiti.
The following chapter will further discuss the diaspora impact on Haitian
development. It will explain why the impact is not working and is in fact affecting
Haitian development in its political, economic, and social sectors negatively.
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Chapter	
  4:	
  Haitian	
  Diaspora	
  Impact	
  on	
  Haiti:	
  Why	
  the	
  impact	
  is	
  not	
  
working?	
  
On Monday, 16 February 2004 the New York Times front page read, “Chaos
Becomes a Way of Life in a Rebel-Held Haitian City.” The article chronicled the
political dispute which turned violent and froze Haiti since the ‘disputed parliamentary
election of 2000. In order to convey the severity of this turmoil, the article opened with a
heart-wrenching story of a woman identifying the ‘bullet-ridden’ body of her dead
husband and confirming that he had been killed by “pro-Aristide militants as he tried to
make his way home [here] during the uprising.” The article also highlighted militant
leaders who opposed Aristide and their intentions to oust him out of the presidential
palace. In so much as Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s power over the country had deteriorated,
so had his followers from the diaspora community turned their backs on him. Mentioned
in the article was a former exile (during the Duvalier regime) and member of Aristide’s
cabinet, Jean-Claude Bajeux, who was recorded having said: “Power that has fallen into
delinquency wants to have its own law, it is for that reason that Aristide lies and kills.”143
In 1990 a large portion of the diaspora in the United States marched down the
streets of Brooklyn, New York in support of Aristide.

In 1994 the whole Haitian

community was elated to see Aristide return to Haiti as its rightful leader. So quickly had
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Aristide’s power deteriorated that only-10 years later- he was once again on the brink of a
coup and members of the diaspora were vehemently opposed to his governing tactics.
When Aristide returned to Haiti in 1994, he was returning to a fragile government
structure, a massive budget deficit, a population begging for basic services, and a wave of
violence that seemed to be predominantly coming from the pro-Duvalier government
faction in the country. One of the things he did to begin a period of recovery was call
upon the Haitian Diaspora to assist in the development of Haiti. Aristide then created the
Ministry of Haitians Living Abroad (MHAVE) coined the ‘10th Department’ to represent
the Haitian diaspora and to begin a structured system of collaborative measures.
This diaspora was supposed to be a key element in the development of Haiti. The
substantial human, social and financial capital along with the benevolent-nature of the
diaspora shown throughout years of scattered remittance and development efforts,
especially those from the US, should have benefitted Haiti positively. During Aristide’s
transitional and presidential period, has the Diaspora’s assistance aided development in
Haiti? Why or why not? How did it affect Haiti? Was aid focused on bringing change to
the political front or economic front, and was it substantial enough to move towards
development in all its aspects?
The addition of the Haitian Diaspora as a major force in Haiti’s development
process (as seen in the last 10 years) is uncertain. Doubtful because there has been a
common denominator in Haitian history, which the diaspora has transplanted and
perpetuated as its been involved in the Haitian democratic and developmental process.
That common denominator is the fragmented social structures in Haiti, which the Haitian
Diaspora has transplanted into the diaspora community in the United States. With the
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disjointed nature of the diaspora this has impeded the development of Haiti’s political
and civic atmosphere. The lack of collaboration has also affected development work
supported by the diaspora, hindering any successes or temporary solutions with no longterm sustainability. Lastly, the diaspora has become the vehicle of re-inserting and
establishing a more viable core-periphery, or more specifically, a metropolis-satellite
relation between the United States and Haiti.
The following chapter will further discuss the diaspora impact on Haitian
development. It will explain why the impact is not working and is in fact affecting
Haitian development in its political, economic, and social sectors negatively. It will also
discuss the US-Haitian relations (core-periphery) perpetuated by the Haitian Diaspora.

Haitian	
  Diaspora	
  impact	
  on	
  Post-‐Duvalier	
  transition	
  
Michel S. Laguerre’s three waves of Haitian egress highlights that the ‘economic
disparities among Haitian American households can be traced to the history of Haitian
immigration into the United States.’ When the first wave (1957-1964) of professionals,
educated and elite left Haiti, ‘many of them were able to attend professional schools and
or to find jobs in the US because they had entered the country legally.’144 The second
wave (1964-1971), the middle class Haitians exited Haiti on tourist visas and stayed
beyond their tourist visa’s expiration.

And the third wave which started in 1971,

‘consisted of lower-class Haitians, both urban dwellers and peasants, in boatloads headed
to the shores of Florida,’ as undocumented refugees.
144
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Since the Haitian Diaspora started trickling in to the United States, they brought
with them the economic and political positions of their Haitian history. Many from the
first and second waves had the intention of returning to Haiti once it was freed of
Duvalierism. And many educators, businessmen, and political officials did so as well as
diaspora from the third wave. However, the way in which Aristide’s transition was
unfolding, it became evident that members of the diaspora community had ‘conflicting
political and social interests.’ Once democracy was restored in Haiti, cultural issues
more than politics emerged as a defining element of the Haitian community.145 Divisions
between the old and new generations of Haitian immigrants made unity within the
diaspora almost impossible to achieve.146 Jean-Pierre further explains:
“A multitude of political organizations, 80 at last count,
that sprung up in the last couple of years…Ninety percent
of these groups are composed of 20 people or fewer …this
fragmentation is hard to politically influence their
representatives, whether local or national…in a permanent
ad hoc approach, these groups come and go depending on
the nature and duration of the crisis at hand.”147
Further evidence that political fragmentation exists within the diaspora are the
‘fractious relations among the three major competing Haitian weeklies…they are a
‘mirror of the rips and tears in Haitian society, the rivalry among these weeklies often
borders on ideological war.148 Radio programs hosts and the listeners no longer had a
common enemy-the repressive, undemocratic Haitian government. Once democracy was
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restored, the differences of opinion that were relatively unimportant previously emerged
as critical divisions within the community.149
The political fragmentation of the diaspora in the US translated seamlessly into
Haiti. When it comes to the politics of Haiti there are just as many transitional problems
and with the added political struggles within the diaspora the political instability of the
Haitian government is exacerbated. Anthony P. Maingot (1986) highlighted the diaspora
factor in Haiti’s first year of transition. Maingot first explained that certain facets of
Haiti’s social structure might impede the process of transition to democracy. These
features are essentially problems that originate from Haiti’s historically fragmented
structure and “soft state” modus operandi.

To begin, Maingot calls attention to

understanding Haiti’s historical political traditions, which he defines as political
individualism.

This concept has persisted in Haiti due to its “multitude of social

divisions,” viz., historical race-class division between blacks and mulattoes, regional,
religious, language divisions difference (French vs. Creole), as well as differential levels
of education, healthcare, and of opportunities in general.150 The Haitian story is reflected
in the internal class diversity that characterizes the Haitian Diaspora.151
Maingot continues by highlighting one of the six problems that the diaspora factor
has added to the environment of homeland politics:
“Haiti’s fourth problem: the presence of a large number of
risk – free participants, the many key actors who are
149
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exogenous to the system and have relatively little to lose in
the struggle. [Haitian exiles permanently residing abroad.
They invest money, publish newspapers, send delegations
to the island, and generally tend to get more attention than
do most local actors. This last point raises the crucial
question of the proper role for “outsiders” in a postauthoritarian transitional period, such as that of
contemporary Haiti.]”152
In relation to the previously mentioned dilemma is the added problem within
Haiti –What happens when the diaspora returns to Haiti? Maingot coins this as the
“problem of the asymmetry of motivation.” This is the problem in Haiti where groups on
the extremes of both Left and Right share disdain [“bourgeois democracy”]. It lies [more
correctly] between exiled politicians and those who stayed behind. The very length of
the time spent in exile has much to do with it. A lengthy exile tends to break contacts,
which are difficult to rebuild in a situation where the “law of large number” and an
“outguessing regress” make for shifting targets. The temptation to run their campaigns
from abroad, and /or through subordinates, can be fatal in a system, which is at once so
personal and so communal.153
Maingot’s argument in this stage is further supported by Laguerre’s (1998)
observations that “some local people are suspicious of the newcomers from the diaspora
not only because they take jobs from the locals, but also because of their double
allegiance.” So far, most diasporic cabinet members have been on “loan”, returning
abroad at the end of their term in office. For example, shortly after the Manigat and
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Aristide coups d’etat, diasporic cabinet members were granted protection by the
embassies of their adopted countries.’154
Maingot’s sixth and final problem that Haiti must tend to is the problem of the
“manipulated agenda.” “In Haiti this means large numbers of individuals and groups
with high expectations but no general framework, information, or group mechanisms for
interaction and bargaining-is ripe for a manipulated outcome.”155 With much of what has
happened in the Haitian political stage, many would support that this is exactly what has
happened. Haiti is still lacking socio-political cohesion and the added diasporic factor
has not aided in easing civic tensions in Haiti.
Indicators from the Freedom House organizations on civil liberties and political
rights also show that with the fragility of Haiti’s political forum it has struggled to
develop in the political stage. During the times of the Duvalier regime Haiti consistently
ranked as ‘Not Free’ under Freedom House indicators.156 However, in 1986-87 enjoying
the vibrant new atmosphere of a political forum indicated that Haiti was transitioning
towards democracy as it exercised it political will; Freedomhouse ranked Haiti as
Partially Free (PF) during that time. In the years that followed, Haiti has wavered back
and forth between these two rankings however, with minimal success in sustaining at
least a PF status.
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Haitian	
  Diaspora	
  impact	
  on	
  Civil	
  Society	
  	
  
Traditional and more formal institutions are supposed to be the drivers of
developmental strategy and implementation. In Haiti it has not been the case, mostly due
to the weakened state of the Haitian government. And when it has been strong (Duvalier
regime), it has been shown that civil society (rural/urban) has received services in such a
way that has marginalized and fragmented social structures. In the case of the Haitian
Diaspora, it is evident that it has contributed to Haiti’s civil society in helping to bring
basic social services and needs to Haiti. Many of these labors have been in place of the
incapacitated-state of the Haitian government. Almost as an extension of the political
fragmentation however, recent studies have shown that diaspora efforts with civil society
in Haiti have also been less than successful due to the fragmented diaspora social
structure that exists.
The IDB’s research on the diaspora activity in bringing basic social services to
Haiti found that first and foremost the diaspora organizations and associations in the US
were disjointed in nature.157
“Hometown associations are by far the most numerous,
[however], the HTAs in each city (in the US) typically
operate independently and in a different manner. The
professional organizations are by definition more elitist and
more national in character…smaller groups, struggling for
resources and access were not inclined to explore possible
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collaboration or support
treated disdainfully.”158

[for concern] they would be

Furthermore, the study focused on how diaspora organizations function.
Although there were many that are well-operating non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), many of the those organizations “established between 1995 and 2000 have
operated on a small scale and depended on funding from family and friends,’” moreover
“only two had obtained a 501c3 non-profit status.” This is due to the lack of knowledge
or training in needs assessment, fundraising strategies, designing project proposal,
planning accessing information and identifying potential sources of support of those who
establish HTAs.159
The non-collaborative nature of associations and organizations in the United
States has shown to be equally ineffective to bringing a broader comprehensive approach
to development in Haiti’s civil society. Diaspora organizations operate in Haiti mostly as
small projects and limited to particular places (working separately and without
coordination). The IDB research determined that “many of the specific projects now
underway will not prove to be sustainable and this is generally due to declining
membership of older HTAs, funding, sustainable maintenance and lack of local
resources.”160
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More specifically, very few projects work on, promote, or achieve community
empowerment (human and social capital) and infrastructural development. Not enough
organizations engage local participation in decision-making and planning.

Diaspora

groups that create and establish local community organizations are, ‘on the whole, weak.’
Furthermore, Diaspora and Haitian community relations are subject to tensions.161
“Haitian groups in all cities expressed mixed feelings about
their Haiti-based counterparts, i.e., compassion for their
needs but caution regarding their capacities to manage
money and projects; [moreover] diaspora contributions that
are seen as patronizing are unlikely to elicit the active
cooperation of community members”162
The diaspora has volunteered their time, expertise, money, and have delivered
direct services.163 However, projects put forth by the Haitian Diaspora are seemingly
perpetuating the same structural fragmentation and to some extent creating a cyclical
form of dependency or rather further weakening the Haitian government responsibility to
manage developmental strategy and implementation.
“As the New York based social analyst Francois PierreLouis has written: In a country like Haiti where the state is
weak, the hometown associations, if they are organized and
financed, can implement certain projects more effectively
than the government bureaucracy. However, while they
may come with good intentions to implement sound
projects for the population, they can also undermine the
authority of the state by competing with one another and
creating duplicate projects.”164
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Haitian	
  Diaspora	
  and	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  	
  
Since Haiti’s independence, economics, geography, labor, and politics have tied
the US and Haiti. In the 1970s, as Haitian refugees were immigrating en mass to United
States, US-Haitian relations remained a state-to-state function. However, the 1990s saw
a changing dynamic where the Haitian Diaspora had a role in US-Haitian relations. This
role of state to actor relations has further strengthened the involvement of Diaspora in
Haiti.
Carolle Charles most notably highlights “how immigrant communities also are
involved in the transnational processes of nation-building… and also interacting with the
process of hegemonic power relationships between a strong state (the United States) and
a weak state (country of origin).”165
One way to explain it is in the events previously mentioned: 1) In April 20, 1990,
the Haitian Diaspora marched from Grand Army Plaza in Brooklyn, across the Brooklyn
Bridge to Wall Street protesting a decision by the Centers for Disease Control; 2) The
coup against Aristide Sept. 30, 1991, was followed by immediate protests in Washington,
Miami, Boston, Montreal and New York, with a major protest in New York announced
for Friday, Oct. 11, 1991. Over 60,000 people blocked downtown Manhattan for hours to
protest against apparent tacit U.S. support of the military coup.166
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The Haitian Diaspora has successively engaged the US government in the area of
refugee policies. And with the eventual return of Aristide to Port-au-Prince by the United
States, the Haitian Diaspora has taken a more active role in Haitian/US relations. No
longer are these relations left to state-to-state function.

Members of the diaspora

community have managed to become major actors changing the way in which the US
approaches Haiti. There have been instances of “Diasporas participating in island politics
[who] contact US Congressmen and formal, voluntary and grassroots organizations for
favors on behalf of Haiti…also members of the diaspora have been able to introduce their
presidential candidates to US politicians and to members of Congress.”167
On the involvement of ‘immigrant communities and nation-building,’ Laguerre
(1998) says it best: “to understand the importance of the United States in Haitian affairs
is to spell out the relations that Port-au-Prince maintains with the diaspora in Miami, New
York and Boston.168 These cities are at the core of Haitian Diaspora transnational
activity and extend to the Haitian economic, political and social societies. Politically,
diaspora groups and non-governmental organizations in New York City subsidiaries
serve as subsidiaries of the headquarters of their operations in Port-au-Prince. As such,
they raise funds to be channeled to Haiti, and are consulted in the headquarters’ decision
–making processes.169 Economically, transnational businesses are created to satisfy both
diasporic and Haitian markets. Whether its Haitian products being provided in the US to
the Haitian diaspora or introducing US products to the Haitian market, ‘sustained
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economic relations between the US and Haiti add a new impetus to the existing formal
trade relations between the countries.170
Nevertheless, the “economic-spheres,”171 along with political and social activities
are extensions of a dependency that is not favorable to Haitian development. And
although these relations have long been established as a state-to-state function the
diasporic community in its new role has changed this. Transnational diasporic activity
has generally operated on an informal basis. And with this the informal and sometimes
ad hoc nature of the diaspora activity undermines Haiti’s already weak government.
Laguerre defines the informal transnational activities of the diaspora as
experimental, transitional, multiplex, multi-vocal, underground, and transnational in
practice.172 It is through these modes of conduct that the diaspora has become a ‘major
factor in the opening up of the political system in Haiti.’173 Although this may be true,
given the disjointed social structures within the diaspora how effective can this be in
creating a cohesive effort to develop Haiti? It is understandable that with the many years
of living abroad, the diaspora has amassed a human capital unequal to that of Haiti in all
its aspects. However, the diasporic reach and pace are always leaving the “formal state
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of Haiti in a process of clarifying its relations with the overseas tentacle of the nation”
and therefore always in a state of stagnation and constant in the reassessment. 174

Conclusion	
  
This chapter looked at diasporic activities in developmental work (collective
remittances; projects in Haiti) through group associations and organizations. It discussed
its political activism and influence in Haitian politics and furthermore, through its
transnational participation, discussed the way in which the diaspora maintains the US
involvement. Finally, this chapter analyzed the Diasporas modus operandi based on the
fragmented social structures, which is the underlying factor that impedes Haiti’s most
basic development.
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  Chapter	
  5:	
  Conclusion	
  
On April 13, 2011 the United Nations hosted a forum that placed emphasis on
Realizing The Development Potential of Diasporas. It was an opportunity for various
members of the development community to speak on propositions focusing on the
diasporic contributions extending well beyond remittance flows. Moreover, the forum
promoted a recently published book that covered various subjects including migration,
contributions, network links of the diaspora, and presented a framework on how
Diasporas bring opportunities for development to their countries of origin. It is clear that
there is enthusiasm to look to the diaspora for new and innovative ways to further
promote advancement in their country of origin.
This paper looked at the Haitian Diaspora as an active catalyst in Haitian
development. An exploratory analysis on Haitian émigrés in the United States helped to
confirm that the Haitian Diaspora has a significant transnational link to Haiti. These
connections are strengthened with the presence of both political and socio-economic
associations. Moreover, after looking at how political organizations and associations
operate, it becomes apparent that the fractured social class structure is divided by socioeconomic status. Although a unified Haitian Diaspora has proven to be a strong lobby
(i.e., swaying American policy and collective remittance contributions) the factions that
exist beyond that have implications on sustaining the efforts taken on by the diaspora.
Politically, the Haitian migrant community has been an important factor in
opening the channels of political fora in the United States and in Haiti. This was
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particularly demonstrated with Aristide’s return to power in 1994 via US intervention.
The Diaspora’s 300,000-member protest in New York and the subsequent support of
Aristide’s return to Haiti proves that the diaspora is influential and can support the
democratic process. However, in the case of Diaspora involvement in Haitian politics,
either through financial means or access to certain US government officials, it has proven
to be detrimental in influencing a political cohesion as mentioned in chapter four.
The divisions existing within the Diaspora community exacerbate the inability of
political cohesion in the Haitian government. This is generally seen in instances where
the Diaspora uses whatever means necessary to create a particular desired outcome. The
government in turn may look to other diasporic members to find even other means of
support thereby creating a more complex political web.

This in turn, creates an

environment that fosters mistrust and ultimately violence. For example, the disputes of a
contested 2000 election had long destabilized an already weak political environment that
affected the entire country. The effects of perpetuated chasms in Haiti’s government
culminated in 2004. Public services ceased, ‘fear and chaos (and violence) became a way
of life’ once again.

And media outlets worldwide once again documented daring

interceptions of Haitian refugees brazenly heading for Florida shores.
The social development efforts of the diaspora through remittances, HTAs, and
church organizations have been plenty.

The efforts via remittances or collective

remittances (community organizations, projects) help to fulfill the most urgent of needs
to civil society. Furthermore, their contributions can be found operating in areas of Haiti
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where government is barely functional and donors are minimally involved or absent.175
Although their efforts are not affecting development negatively in this way, the
disjointed efforts of these organizations and associations have created pockets of work
that in reality do not bear long-term successes and are marginally effective.
Remittances, whether individual or collective, should help to build a more viable
infrastructure that would eventually lead to development. “Even if the influx of money
and goods were to increase, that alone will not be sufficient to drive development.”176 In
Haiti’s case, it has been known that “the projects meant to upgrade the standard of living
of the residents, by providing them with running water, electricity, school canteens,
clinics for local populations with visiting physicians from the US, libraries and
multipurpose building have provided individual successes, they end up serving as
catalysts for emigration to the United States,” 177
Taking in to consideration the overall argument of development, “projects and
loans –such as for clean water, clinics and schools in remote villages-may have a social
and humanitarian impact, but they do not stimulate” development; “in other words, this
kind of development does no harm,” but it does not create an environment of ownership,
responsibility and good governance.178
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Recommendations	
  
Dr. Hans U. Luther once said: “To resolve home-grown problems; no external
advice, however sound, and no amount of external financing can substitute for self
responsibility and political cohesion in a society.” The transnational link between the
Diaspora and Haiti is strong and therefore has proven to be an influential tool. However,
if that influence does not extend itself to political unification then certain failure is
assured. The Diaspora’s use of US government to support multiple Haitian factions only
further intensifies animosity within Haiti’s political forum. Moreover, pertaining to civil
society, no amount of remittances can ever make a positive enough impact if the way in
which a diaspora approaches assistance is disjointed.
What is needed is a network of diaspora for the benefit of their country of origin.
Unfortunately there still exists the practice of separating oneself from certain aspects of
their immigrant group. In Haiti’s case, many middle-class Haitians distance themselves
from the recently arrived, primarily working-class Little Haiti community, “the want to
make certain that no one mistakes him or her for boat people.”179
The question does not lie in whether the diaspora is assisting in their homeland
but rather in the means by which they assist. For Haiti, political participation has added
more animosity to the Haitian political environment.

In development, diaspora
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organizations alleviate the immediate needs of civil society however; they do not support
more long-term sustainability. Also, most of the time government is not included in the
projects or developmental efforts that they spearhead.
Lastly, how or what should the adopted countries of the diaspora communities do
to assist diasporas to help their countries of origin? Aside from looking at the Haitian
Diaspora in the United States, the International Development Bank study also focused on
the diaspora in Canada and its approach to its Haitian Diaspora. The study found that
there was much more unified diaspora activity happening in Canada than that of the
United States. This was due to Canada’s approach to the diasporic community to assist
Haiti.
“Diaspora organizations in Canada180 are more likely than
those anywhere else to see and receive government support.
Furthermore, Canada has more consistently asked diaspora
organizations to consolidate their multiple small projects,
on grounds that development efforts would be more
effectively served by larger scale efforts. This type of
approach has occurred in the United States minimally.” 181
US/Haitian diasporic relations currently exist in solely a political realm but what is truly
necessary are more grassroots initiatives.
Though the adopted country can manage to assist a diaspora in development
efforts, this does not let the country of origin off quite so easily. Aristide did create the
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‘Tenth Department,’ however the lack of mistrust that came from both sides was enough
to deem the department irrelevant. Already by 1994, there were complains on the lack of
transparency in the ‘Tenth Department.’ If the homeland wants to reach out to its
diaspora, the local government should be willing to facilitate that objective.

Afterthoughts	
  
Today, Haiti’s Human Development Index ranking is 145 out of 169 countries
and areas, positioning it in the low human development category.182 A ranking that was
generated from a value that has not changed significantly, especially towards the increase
of development.

In the United States, however, many Haitians are successful

professionals, which is different than the images we see arriving in the shores of Florida.
The divisions between them and the majority of their fellow countrymen and women are
immense.
These social and economic distinctions remain a prominent part of interaction
within the various Haitian communities in the United States.183 However, social and
economic distinction should not always have to classify one’s intentions to help their
country of origin or their adopted country. What will it take for Diaspora to unite? Will
Haiti ever get on the road to a true and viable development with the support of the
diaspora? More often than not these questions have no easy answer. However, stories,
like that of Roger Biamby, have always happened, pointing out the potential of the
Haitian Diaspora:
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Roger Biamby was sixteen when his family of ten fled to
New York from Haiti in 1964 after his father, Ernst, an
army colonel, launched an unsuccessful coup against
President Duvalier. The Biambys, once part of the Haitian
elite, arrived in New York with only $100. A career
military officer with no experience in the civilian world, the
former colonel took a job collecting litter a the 1964
World’s Fair in Queens. His wife sewed in a garment
factory. His son, Roger, washed dishes at a Times Square
restaurant, eventually putting himself into a doctoral
program in political science. In the 1970s Roger moved to
South Florida, where he has run nonprofit centers in
Miami, Fort Lauderdale, and Pompano Beach that provide
job placement, legal help, and other services to Haitian
immigrants (Grogan 1994). (Stepick 1998:37)
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